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The plaintiff was the purchaser of a parcel of real estate from
the defendant under an installment land contract.' The agreement provided
that, upon the purchaser's default, the seller was entitled to terminate
the contract, retake the land, and retain the money received. After
making payments for a period of five or six years, the purchaser de-
faulted. The seller made demand for the delinquent payments, but the
purchaser did not respond. Following a four-year period of mutual
silence, the purchaser demanded a deed, tendering the entire unpaid
balance of the purchase price plus interest due.2 The seller refused
to accept the sum tendered, claiming a breach of contract and forfeiture
under its terms.3 The purchaser then brought an action for specific
performance on the theory that the contract had made him the equitable
owner of the land and, as such, he was entitled to an opportunity to
redeem. The seller counterclaimed to remove the contract as a cloud
on the title, relying on its contractual right to declare a forfeiture.'
The trial court held for the purchaser, stating that the relationship
of the parties was analogous to that of purchase money mortgagor
and mortgagee, the instrument merely representing security for the
purchaser's performance of the contract. On interlocutory appeal to
the District Court of Appeal, Second District, held, affirmed: Under
a specifically enforceable installment land contract, where the seller
has received part of the purchase price and where he has given the
purchaser possession of the land with the benefits and burdens of owner-
ship, the seller and purchaser are in the same position as purchase
money mortgagor and morgagee. The seller cannot unilaterally and
1. The terms "installment land contract," "land sales contract," "agreement for deed,"
and "contract for deed" will be used interchangeably herein.
After giving a ten percent down payment with the balance of the purchase price pay-
able in monthly installments over approximately ten years, the purchaser recorded the
contract. Recordation is significant because it bars the claims of any subsequent bona fide
purchasers from the seller. Moyer v. Clark, 72 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1954) ; Rabinowitz v. Keefer,
100 Fla. 1723, 132 So. 297 (1931); Carolina Portland Cement Co. v. Roper, 68 Fla. 299,
67 So. 115 (1914) ; Feinberg v. Steams, 56 Fla. 279, 47 So. 797 (1908) ; Stockton v. National
Bank of Jacksonville, 45 Fla. 590, 34 So. 897 (1903).
2. Under the terms of the contract, the purchaser was entitled to a deed only upon
payment of all installments plus interest.
3. The court noted that the record did not indicate whether or not the seller had given
the purchaser notice of election to terminate with a reasonable opportunity to cure the
default. H & L Land Co. v. Warner, 258 So.2d 293, 295 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
4. The purchaser argued: (1) that the seller merely held the legal title to the land as
security for the unpaid balance of the purchase price; (2) that the purchaser's equitable title
under the contract could not be unilaterally and summarily extinguished by a declaration of
forfeiture; (3) that such unilateral action would deprive the purchaser of an opportunity
to redeem; and (4) that the seller had a proper remedy in foreclosure. Id.
5. In the court's view, the net effect of the seller's action would allow the seller to
retain the down payment plus the monthly installments paid over a period of more than
five years, while at the same time recovering all of the land sold. Id.
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summarily extinguish a defaulting purchaser's equitable title. H & L
Land Co. v. Warner, 258 So.2d 293 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).6
Traditionally, the Florida courts have recognized contractual rights
under an agreement for deed. Thus they have permitted a forfeiture
of the purchaser's payments where the contract has so provided.7 In
Stoneman v. Peninsula Land Co.,' the seller brought an action to quiet
title and the purchaser counterclaimed for specific performance. The
District Court of Appeal, Second District, recognized the seller's right
to terminate the contract and to declare a forfeiture in accordance with
the terms of the agreement. The court in Warner, however, held
Stoneman distinguishable on the grounds that in the latter case the
purchaser had failed to either tender or perform material requirements
relating to property improvements, although he was the party seeking
to specifically enforce. Such requirements, the court reasoned, repre-
sented an important part of the consideration for the contract, a factor
not present in Warner.
Mid-State Investment Corp. v. O'Steen,"° represented a departure
from the tradition of allowing a forfeiture of the purchaser's payments
under contractual terms. In Mid-State, the purchasers assigned their
deed to the defendant, an investment corporation, taking back an un-
recorded contract for deed. A long line of cases have held that a deed
absolute on its face is a mortgage when executed to secure the payment
of money." The court, therefore, could have construed the "assignment"
in the first instance as a mortgage. Instead, the District Court of Appeal,
First District, construed the contract for deed as a mortgage as defined by
Florida Statutes section 697.01 (1971).12 Thus, Mid-State was the first
6. The court made the specific assumption that the purchaser either took possession of
the property or had the right to do so. Id. at 294.
7. Goldfarb v. Robertson, 82 So.2d 504 (Fla. 1955); Burke v. Wallace, 98 Fla. 604,
124 So. 30 (1929); Realty Securities Corp. v. Johnson, 93 Fla. 46, 111 So. 532 (1927). In
one earlier case, the Supreme Court of Florida ordered the seller to do equity by returning
all sums in excess of damages resulting from the breach. Taylor v. Rawlins, 90 Fla. 621,
106 So. 424 (1925).
8. 124 So.2d 760 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
9. 258 So.2d at 296.
10. 133 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1st Dist.), cert. denied, 136 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1961).
11. Thomas v. Thomas, 96 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1957); Markell v. Hilpert, 140 Fla. 842,
192 So. 392 (1939) ; Stovall v. Stokes, 94 Fla. 717, 115 So. 828 (1927) ; Connor v. Connor,
59 Fla. 467, 52 So. 727 (1910) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Ashmead, 33 Fla. 416, 14 So. 886 (1894) ;
Walls v. Endel, 20 Fla. 86 (1883); Wiggins v. Morrison, 242 So.2d 184 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970);
Blackwelder v. D'Ercole Enterprises, Inc., 148 So.2d 721 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963) ; Jones v. White,
144 So.2d 1 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962); McLendon v. Davis, 131 So.2d 765 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961);
Kinney v. Mosher, 100 So.2d 644 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1958); Erstllng v. Trinity Wesleyan
Methodist Church, 100 So.2d 74 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
12. FLA. STAT. § 697.01 (1971) provides:
697.01 Instruments deemed mortgages
(1) All conveyances, obligations conditioned or defeasible, bills of sale or other
instruments of writing conveying or selling property, either real or personal, for the
purpose or with the intention of securing the payment of money, whether such
instrument be from the debtor to the creditor or from the debtor to some third
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Florida case to hold that the purchaser under an agreement for deed had
an "equity of redemption."
[T]he contract before us was clearly intended to secure the
payment of money and must be deemed and held to be a mort-
gage, subject to the same rules of foreclosure and to the same
regulations, restraints, and forms as are prescribed in relation
to mortgages, to use the words of the statute. This being so,
the defendant had only a naked legal title as security for the
indebtedness, [and] had no legal right to repossess the real or
personal property .... 13
The court in Warner expressly agreed with the ruling of Mid-State
and held it applicable to Warner. The seller nonetheless claimed that
Mid-State was not controlling. The essence of the seller's argument
hinged upon the distinction that in Mid-State the installment seller
was merely one who had financed the purchase from a third party-
thus involving an actual loan of money-while Warner involved a di-
rect sale from the installment seller to the buyer, with no actual passing
of money. The court, however, refused to give any import to such
distinction. 4
By way of dictum in Huguley v. Hall,5 the Supreme Court of
Florida has previously acknowledged that a defaulting purchaser under
a contract for deed is entitled to an "equity of redemption." The
Huguley court, however, upheld a judgment for rescission and ter-
mination of the agreement, finding that th6 purchasers had abandoned
the "equity of redemption" by failing to affirmatively assert it.' 6
After noting both the difficulty in resolving the issue and the
lack of uniformity in previous decisions, the court in Warner found
several salient points on which it based its decision: (1) that the sel-
ler wanted to retake the land while retaining the down payment as
well as the payments made over a five-year period; (2) that the pur-
person in trust for the creditor, shall be deemed and held mortgages, and shall be
subject to the same rules of foreclosure and to the same regulations, restraints and
forms as are prescribed in relation to mortgages.
(2) Provided, however, that no such conveyance shall be deemed or held to be a
mortgage, as against a bona fide purchaser or mortgagee, for value without notice,
holding under the grantee.
13. Mid-State Investment Corp. v. O'Steen, 133 So.2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
14. 258 So.2d at 296.
15. 157 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1963).
16. In Crouch v. Williams, 179 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965), the District Court of
Appeal, First District, attempted to preclude a seller from retaining any sums in excess of
actual damages. The Supreme Court of Florida, however, rejected the First District's ruling
because it was in conflict with some of the supreme court's decisions where it had un-
equivocally held that a defaulting purchaser is not entitled to recover from the seller any
sums paid in part performance of an executory contract. Williams v. Crouch, 186 So.2d 491
(Fla. 1966). The court in Warner distinguished that line of cases on the theory that they
had involved a defaulting purchaser who sought to recover amounts already paid to a non-
defaulting seller rather than one who sought to pay amounts owed. 258 So.2d at 296.
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chaser's rights to enter the land with all the benefits and burdens of
ownership were similar to the rights of a purchase money mortgagor;
(3) that the agreement for deed was a security instrument subject to
a documentary stamp tax both as a conveyance and as a written obli-
gation to pay money, and also subject to an intangible tax as a money
obligation secured by a real property lien; (4) that Florida recognizes
the doctrine of equitable conversion, whereby the purchaser under a
purchase and sale contract becomes the equitable owner of the land
and the seller holds the legal title as security for the purchaser's
performance; 7 (5) that Mid-State had allowed an "equity of redemp-
tion" pursuant to Florida Statutes section 697.01 (1971); and (6) that
the dictum in Huguley seemed to permit an "equity of redemption"
under an agreement for deed.'
Nonetheless the court expressly qualified its holding to apply
only to installment land contracts which are specifically enforceable
and under which the buyer has the right to possession or the benefits
and burdens of ownership. 9 In addition, the court stated that it was
not deciding the recovery rights of a defaulting purchaser who fails
to tender full performance and who is willing to trade his equity of
redemption for a return of all or part of the installments paid."0
In view of these considerations, the decision seems justified. The
court seems to have approached the question by alluding to the nature
of the instrument, analogizing it to a mortgage. The holding of the
court, however, seems to imply that where a specifically enforceable
land sales contract is involved, foreclosure is the seller's sole remedy
against a defaulting purchaser:
With respect to rights, remedies, and safeguards, we believe
that there should not be substantial differences based solely
upon whether the buyer's obligation to pay the deferred por-
tion of the sale price is evidenced and secured by an install-
ment land contract or by a purchase money mortgage. In the
absence of statutory direction to the contrary, we seek by our
holding to afford well-established safeguards to an installment
17. On this point the Warner court cited a decision of the District Court of Appeal,
First District, wherein the court allowed a purchaser to claim an equity of redemption
under a purchase and sale contract, in order to obtain the benefit of condemnation
proceedings. Id. at 295, citing Arko Enterprises, Inc. v. Wood, 185 So.2d 734 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1966).
18. 258 So.2d at 295-96.
19. 258 So.2d at 296. Stated otherwise, the court explicitly excluded from the opera-
tion of its ruling: (1) sales contracts which are not specifically enforceable; (2) contracts
under which the buyer does not have the right to possession or other benefits and burdens
of ownership; (3) short term real estate contracts, commonly known as deposit receipt
contracts, entered into in preparation for the closing of a real estate transaction; and (4)
purchase options.
20. Id.
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buyer and to allow an installment seller a reasonable and tradi-
tional remedy.
21
The contract for deed has been recognized as an important tool
for increasing the flexibility of real estate financing. The purchaser
generally purchases with very little equity while the seller avoids the
problems and expenses that may be involved in foreclosing a mortgage.
In the writer's view, the advantages of this type of instrument may
be eliminated if the implication of the holding in Warner is followed
in the future.
MICHEL ANDERSON
21. Id. (emphasis added).
